Grain export agreements - no gains, no losses by Clifton B. Luttrell
Grain Export Agreements No Gains,
No Losses
CLIFTON B. LUflRELL
1I~l-tERE hasbeen atremendous amountofpublic-
ity aboutthe U.S. grain export agreementswith the
U.S.S.R. in 1975 and Chinain 1980.Thethreat ofnot
renewing the agreement with Russia, which would
haveterminatedOctober 1 thisyear, was considered
by sometobe a heavypenalty — both to the United
States and the Soviets. Virtually no economicanal-
ysis has been done, however, thatlooks behind the
publicity to determine the actual economic conse-
quences of the treaties. This article assesses the
major economicconsequences ofthese agreements.
The Agreements
The first bilateral grain sale agreement was made
with the Soviets in 1975 for afive-yearperiod begin-
ning October 1, 1976; the second was made with
China in 1980 for a four-year period beginning
January 1, 1981. Both agreements call for sales to
be made in cash at prevailing market prices. They
setminimumand maximum quantities ofgrain tobe
purchasedfrom the United States, and prohibit the
re-exportofthe grain to other nations.
The Soviet agreement stipulated that beginning
October 1, 1976, the U.S.S.R. would buysix millioa
metric tons ofwheat and corn in about equal pro-
portions from U.S. private commercial sources in
each 12-month period. This quantity could be in-
creased tip to 2 million metric tons in any 12 months
withoutconsultation. Ifthe U.S.S.R. wished to pur-
chaseadditional amountsin anyyear, itwas required
to iinniediately noti5m the U.S. government
The agreement with China calls for U.S. grain
exports to China of 6 to 8 million metric tons each
calendar yearbeginning January 1, 1981, ofwhich
15 to 20 percent will be corn and the remainder,
wheat. China may purchase an additional 1 million
tons without prior notification.1
Objectives oftheAgreements
The purposeofthe agreements, according to U.S.
government officials in press releases and hearings,
is to provide greater stability in Soviet and Chinese
purchases of grain from the United States. The
agreements allegedly will require the Soviets and
Chinese to purchase grain on a regular basis;hence,
there should be fewer “surprises” to the U.& grain
markets. The importing nations are assured that
during the term ofthe agreementsthe UnitedStates
shall not exercise any discretionary authority to
control expoits purchased according to the agree-
ment. Charles W. Robinson, a participant in the
Soviet agreement, stated, “instead of uncertainty
each year as to whether Sovietpurchases would be
15 or 20 million tons or zero, grain producers and
the markets now have an additional element that
canbe taken into account He furthercontended
that fanners, consumers and our maritime industry
‘The Bateau orNational Aflhulrs, Inc.,Daily Report for Era-u-
tiees, October 22, 1980, p~.L4-5; United States Department of
Agriculture, Report ofthe Secretary ofAgriculture, 197.5. p. 11;
Agricultural Outlook (December 1980),pp. 18-19; andMonthly
Econoink Letter (First National City Bank of New York, De-
cember 1975). pp. 12-t3.
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‘‘woul ci all benefit from the expanding opportcm ities
for employment generated by this long—term agree-
ment.’’2 Former Agriculture Secretaryl3ob I3ergland,
in announcing the agreement with Gb ma, said itwas
necessary to reduce the element of surprise.’’~The
allegeclgains to the maritime mndustr~ ‘are mentioned
because the agreement contains a clal ise requiring
that U.S. vessels carry not less than one—third of all
of the grain purchased pursuant to the agreement.
While no official press releases have claimed that
the agreements \vil I increase overall grain exports,
a n imher of statements to this efidct have been
macIc. For exzunple, in connection with as timniarv
of the U.S. fdrm export outlook, the United States
Department ofAgriculture reported that ‘‘the four—
year grain agreement between the Un itecl States
and China will boost future U.S. exports of grain
to China well above the 4 million tons exported to
China in 1979 as well as the previous record of 4.3
million in 1973.’’~The Secretary of Agriculture re-
ported that ‘‘grain sales under the Chinese agree—
nient will probably be worth about SI billion pc~
year.”~
Furthermore, news coverage of the treaties
generally viewed the agreements as vehicles for
enhancing export sales. TheS t. Louis Globe-
I)emoerat, referring to the Chinese agreement,
reported ‘‘the agreement is expected to help ap-
pease grain farmers angered hr a U.S.grain embargo.
The agreement is designed to help trade ex-
pansion 6
The favorable early impact of the Soviet agree-
ment on the farm sector was emphasized by The
Lcoiioui1st: ‘‘The day the farmers have been waiting
fhr more and more impatiently came on Monday,
October 20th when the grain agreement with the
Russians was fin~d ly signed.’’7 Such announcements
led both the farming sector and mucili of the public at
2State~n en t alCharles \V. Rol2inson, Uncle rseeretan- IorEc:o,101 Ic
Affairs, Dt-’partm ent f State. i ted States-—S rlet Ceoii Ag lee—
went, 8.2-192 rInd Ut/ic’,’ Ala//en, Hearings Belore the Snbcoiu—
ni Ittee on internatio 2)) Finalice of HIc Committee on Banking,
housing 111(1Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety—Fourth
Congress, 5.2192, December 9 & 10. 1975, pp. 66, 67 and 72.
25 tatei lent bv Secrd tan of Agric, I ire Bob 13ergianci iii 1)oi/p
Report for Exera/ices, October 22, 1180. pp. LI—S.
~AgrienItnro/ Ott/took (l)eeeniher l9~0), p. 18.
5
1
)oi/q Report for Lrec’utices. October 22, 1980, p. LS.
~‘‘c:rai,j Deal, St. Lotus C/obr—flr,ooejot, October 23, 1980.
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lar re to s H n the agreement as c hides for inert ‘is—
ing Os eral I U.~.gr am exports and tahilizmncr year—to—
~eu les els of expoi ts.
ASSFSSING THE IMPAC 01 fUE
H TSSIA~GRAIN AGREEMFNT
Although it is too eai lv to asse S mpmricalls the
eon quences of the gi am agleenic nt ssith China
the Russian ‘tgicement provmclc 5 an oppoitunits Ioi
analysis. Fiom 1917 to 1972 thc U.S.S.R. xsa gen—
ciaIls a net ‘xpoi tei of giam. Beginning ss ith the
marketing sa i1971/72 howes U it became t
i inporte i of grain and has remainc ci so each sear
since tIn n, impoiting much of its idditional require—
ments from the I.nited States. Ilence , the United
State s xpoited “iain to the Sos iets foi fis e~ ears
prioi to the cUe cti e date of th ‘ tu ats’ and f’oi fis e
sears since the tic ats ~sas si rued. Although the em-
bargo p1 iced on grain shipnients to the Sos ic-ts in
mid—19i9/SO (calIy January 1950)1united exports to
the amounts stipulated in the agreement it is p05—
sihIc at Icast partiall~to asscss the treats ‘ effeetis e —
nc s. in ichieviug the objectis es that have s’’tiion Is
he en associated with it.
Ilie ni ilketinc, cal he ‘in 3 nnc 1 foi ‘she it. h iiles , ,,ndi ott
mc! (Ii ‘tohc I foi coin mc) so,m,hnnm pain
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Impact on Volume of Grain Exports
If tiie agreement has resulte 1 in larger overall
grain exports without offsetting dee] mires in the cx—
ports of other farm products, total U.S. farm exports
‘WOuld i)e expecteel to show a oue—tinre t11)ward shift
fbllowingthe agreement, other things equal. Hosv—
ever, this has not occurreel. Real U.S. flirm exports,
which are shown in table 1, had l)eeu ii’icreasingatan
11 percent rate fronr 1970 to 1976 svhen the grain
agreement became effective. This trenel largely’ re—
Hected thefreerfhreign trade policies that the United
States and othernations establ ished in the 19 ,,50sand
l9GOs.9 Following the treaty (I976—SO), f’arnr exports
gress’ at a slower 7.9 percent rate. Hence, if’otlrer fac—
tors that affect exports renrained unchanged, there is
111) evi ience that the grc)’svtlr oftotal real {àrtn exports
has increased in response to tIre Soviet treat)’.
(45 wheat ai-ui feed grain (largely corn) exports
are shown in table 2-Ag’am, there is no evidence
that the growth ofeither w.’heator feed grain exports
has accelerated following the treat’s’. U.S. wheat
exports rose at an average annual rate ofY. 6 percent
from 1970/71 to 1975/76 (the last pre-treaW market-
big year) and at a 5.4 percent rate from 1975/76 to
1979/SO. The aniriiai rate of increase iii total ked
°SceCI ilton B , LimttrelI, ‘‘ Hi sing Faj’in Exports )mncl bite ‘national
Trade Policies,” tills Ret/etc ~Jiihv19791, 1)1’’ 3’l 0.
grain exports slow’e l fi’oin 2 1 .4 percent over the
1971/72-1975/76 period to 7.9 percent for the
1975/76-1979/50 1)eriod following the treaty. An-
nual growth in total exports )fwheatplus feed grain
dccclerated fhnn 16.0 percent prior to the treaty to
6,9 percent fbliowing tire treaty.
The record of U.S.S.R. grain insports‘‘ and utiliza—
tim-i before and after the treaty is shown in table 3.
There ss’~is iio major break inoverall grain ilii1)orts by
the Sox’iets atthe ef’fhctiye treaty date (October 1976).
The Russians, however, apparently sI’iifted some
grain purcircises froni other nations to tIm United
States following tire treaty until the embargo in
early 1980. For the five vermrs prior to the treaty,
U.S.S.R. purchases average 8. 1 million iiietric toirs
ofgnmin per sear hour the Uriite lStates (72 percent
of Soviet net grain iInl)orts) and 3.2 million metric
t )iisl)C~ year from non—U.S. sources. During the three
years follorving the treaty anel prior to tIre early 1980
grain embargo, Soviet ptmrcliases from the United
States rose to 10.6 million metric tons per year (84
percent oftotal Soviet iniports), while iniports from
non—U.S. sources declined to 2.0 million metric toi’is
per~ear.Hence, the gains in U.S. salesto the Sos’iets
tended to be offset Isv reduced Soviet grain plir—
chases elsewhere.
This, Iroweser, does not indicate that American
farmers gained significantly horn this response.
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since they sell grain in the world market. Slnfting
Soviet purchases from one nation to another doe’s not
alter world demand for grain or tire average grain
price-. Shifts in Soviet grain purcl’utses from other
grain—exporting nations to U.5. hcrnrers are o ffret
by reduced U.S. exports to non—Soviet nations. No
overall change necessarily occurs in total world
grain trade.
Stability of USSR Grain Imports
Soviet grain purchases from the Un ited States
were somewhat niore stable fhllowiug the signing
of the treaty than before. 1~orexample, as shown in
table 4. time standard deviation (a meas tire of the
variation around the arithmetic mean) of such
exports dccibred (although the dcci inc was not sta-
tistical Iv significant) from 6.0 in illion metric tons
during the six pre—treatv “ears (1970/71—1975/76) to
3.2 million in the five years following the treaty.1°
I lowever, as shown iii trdile ~3,theSoviets realized an
unusually small harvest in 1975/76 which tended to
1O1’lmc coc’IIic’ic’imt ol \/mrilmtlon ctlmc’ stzmnchtircl clcviaticnm clinched!
by the ciritlminic’tic nnc’alm 1 dec-hued Ironm ,687 to 207,
distort the results toward less stabihtv in the pre—
ti’eatv veai’s
Stability of World Grain Markets
J mist bccaumse Soviet grain pmirchases from tire
Unite-cl States may have been more’ stable l)rilowing
the treaty, however, does not mean that world grai ii
markets were stabilized by the treaty. lii fact, the iii-
creased stahihty ofpmirehiases from the UmuteciStates
may have ied to Ic’ss stable purchases from other na-
tions. Altlrommgh tIre dif’fbrence is not statistically sig-
nificant, the’ standard deviation of net Soviet pr—
chases Ironr othc’r nations rose from 7.0 in iii ion nretnc
tons in tire pre-treaty )‘ears to 10.6 in illi ion metric tons
foilowing the treat~’.As a result, total i mnports b~’
the’ Soviets show little evidence of increased sta—
I)ii it)’ since the’ treaty. i’hie standard dcvi atii m of
total Sovie’t imports declined on lv from 12.7 in illion
metric tons prior to the treaty to 11.0 liii ii idin metric
tons foliowi mmg the treaty.
An~’apparent increase in stahihtv of Soviet grain
imports f’ollowing tire treaty can in parthe explained
b~’sural her fiuctmiations in year—to—year Sovic’t grain
production in tire post-treaty \‘ears. Grain prodnc ti on
in the Soviet I., nion has always varied widely from
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ve’ar to \‘ear, refiectimrg a larger variability’ in weather
conditiomrs compared with mrranyotirernations. but tire
variation was sonre’wirat less following tIre treaty.”
F’urthermnore, total imrterirationai graimr imrrports b~’
all non—Soviet nations were apparently mr’more stable
fhllosving the agre’e’mnrent. Tire standard cleviatiomr of
such imports eieciimreel (although tire decline was mrot
statistical 1)’ significant) froirr 13.0 mm II ion tons prior
to time tre’atv to 12.2 nmiflion foilowimmg time treaty, amid
tire coe fficiemrts of variation ele’ci imre’el fromn .106 to
.075, respectively.
Stability of’Grain Price
To tire exte’nrt that Soviet grain pmmrchrases from
tire Umrited States foflowinmg tIme agre’eirrenrt were’
stabilized at tire’ c’xpense of greater instahd its’ in
their purcirases elsewimere, time agreeirremrts we’re
not a factor iii stcthihzimrg either U.S. or world grain
price’s. Tire’ U.S. price is ele’ternninecl b~’world
si mpplv airdl (IC’inancl conditiomrs, amid Soviet pur-
chases fromu ammv otimer mmation typically irave’ about
tIre samrme i mrrpac’t cm U.S. grain pnces as if time pur-
chase’s sve’re nradc clire’ctiv f’rommm tire Umuited States.
Aitirougim price’s of keel graimm muid wheat appar-
ently stabilized1 somnewirat fromrr tire pre-treat~\‘ears
1970-76 to time post—treat)’ years 1977—SO, this’ appar—
tm1
Doriimg time six pre—trc’aty years time standard cicyfadion (ml Soc jet
grain production micchncch [mmmi 27,8 nmihhioml nmctrie tons with a
coil bcmeimt of carimitmon oh .152, to 24,5 moihhon metric tours svitim
a cimc’lfncieimt cml cariation of .119 foiiowcmrg timm’ treaty,
emrt stabi itv is riot statistically confirnred.m2 More’—
over, thue average price’ of all U.S. crops sirows
greater reeluction iir variatiomm timanm feed graimi amid
wimeat prices. Heurce, apparemit price variability dc—
dined nrore in crops not imrvolveel in the treaty than
in keel grain and svlreat. Once agaimi, there is no cvi-
dlemree that the treaty provided a price—stabilizing
imupact 0mm tIre traded graimrs.
Grain Storage
Iurcreasedl storage’ of graimr h’s’ tire Soviets foiiowinmg
tire treaty couldl have’ rcsuite’d inn less variable Soviet
graimr immrports and, hemiee, had sonic efleet omr world
graimr prices.13 Greater buildup of graimr rese’rx’cs
mm
Dnrnmmmz time pre’treaty \-emmrs tIme c’om’ffie’ient of c-ariationi tnl time
price ol leech grain was 387 airdh for all crops 321, while in tine
p0 St—tn’emits c-c’ ‘mrs time ccmeI lie fend mt yam i/mtionn 01 tim m’ price of f ec’d
graimn was 139 cold
1
for all emmmps 101. iii otimer words, tIme co-
efficient mmf ymirimmtioim br all crimps was 83 Increeimt mis large mis timm’
die file jend for leer! gm’mmi mm iii tir mc pm’cc-treaty pc rjmd innit wmm S inn!’
73 pe i’c’ent mm m Immrge in ti c’ i~ mn t’tremmtv ye mii’s’ Tint’ cctel Clefc’nt of
ari mmtmtin I dirall en nps hkewis 7 di’ci immcci ‘cimiti4/c’ tin wimc mit. ci rc
ping ironn 68 percent ml time whit-mit eoclficicnt in the pre—trc’atv
vccmmrs to -II pierce imt in tin m’ post—tmc’atr’ 4/ears,
~ fmcetimr thmmmt tencic’ci to imrcrc’mmsc the c-mmrimdmihitv of Scmyic’t firm—
ports Following tint’ trc’atv was (mc’ inc’rc’mmsecb stmdniht~-imi Soc ic’t
gm-mu nn sage, Tmntmd r’car—tcm—ve’mm r ,grmm cm nitihization by tin c’ Si is I c’t
was definitely stainilized almcmtnt ]976177, mite ycmmr in winidim time
rc’city cvmis Oracle. DorOng thuc’ Iivc’ pm’e—tremctv ye mli’s tint)! I gm-aiim
cmtmlmzation linmetnnted qcmmtm’ sinarpic- lrctnm 4/car tin yemcr havinmg a
stmmndmmrd dc’s-iatiour iii 15,7 mniihiomi metric’ toims. i”cnlimmwimrg time
I remmty tire stmnmchmn’cl dcyimiticmn of totmmi gm-al mm nitil izaticmmm wmms only
-1.3 unmdhioir mrmetrie tons, ‘lime c’oetljeicmmt-smifymniatimnn cml grmmin misagi’
pn’i mm r tcm aunt! mi i1mw in g tine tn-cmmty ‘4/c’m’e .tIS marc! 02. rc’spu eti e I y,
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during good crop s-ears would pernrr it tIme-c Soviets
td) tmtilizec such reserves amid to imrrportless tircur other-
wise foiiowimrg poor crop years. Charles Robinsour
contended that a Soviet buildup of grain rc-cserves
is inhmere’nrt in tIre agrecenremitbecause they are eom—
mittecl to pnrclmase a mrrimmrr i ttn quammtity ofgrainr each
year.’4 Ofcourse, it coumld always be argued that tire’
Soviets have less inrcem’mtive to store large qmtantities
of grain s~-’itir amr assnrecd suppi y available at mmrarket
Iiriees. Nevertheless, with greater grainr stocks, tire
Soviets e’oudd have supplemirenrtedl grain us-age with
less irmrports foliowinrg relative’by small graimr iram-s’ests.
Tire data, however, imrdieate that rio bmtielmtp in
Soviet graimr stocks occurred Ibliowimig the treaty.
Total Soviet grainr stocks dleelimiedl 13.0 mnrihlion tiretric
tours during tire six pre—treaty calendar sears 1970/
71—1975/76 and dcci iirc’d another 5.0 mruiihion elmiring
the five post-treaty years 1976/77-1980/81 (table 3).
Ftmrtinernrore, as inrdicated ecarheer, Soviet graimu pro—
dnetiomr was larger amid somewhat less cariable in
tire post—treaty ~‘ears thami elumrinrg tire pre—treaty
years. Hence, iftire Soviets irad plans fbr immcrecasing
their stock of storedl graimr, tire post—treaty years
wou id irave beemi a relatively favorable period in
which to elo so. Evide’m’mce, imowever, irmdicate’s that
inrstead of imrereasing stocks, tire Soviets immereased re—
hamice our xvorlel mrrarkets to smrrooth out the impact of
s’ariatiomr in animal proeluetion our shmort—runr supply
so as to mainrtaimi relatively’ stable eonsummrmption
Exports Following Treaty
Consistent Wit/i A World Grai-n Market
(;rmurr is sold by’ tirose’ urations hr wim id’lr the cost of
producing it is low relative to time worldl price; it is
pm tre’Imasecl by’ tlrose tratiomms mm winch tire’ cost of pro—
dltmecimrg (mrrore grmui mm is irigim relative to time svorld
price. Unless tire’ Sovie’t orCirinecse grainm agre’emnents
irmtsc’ amm i tinpact 0mm ovecral i graimr elemrramid or mtpomm
xvoriel graimr produmction (sutppiv), tirc-,v svil I have no
immrpaet omm overall graitr simipnnents or 0mm total U.S.
graimr exports. ‘~
m/st.it(,mnni,imt mv d/4hmcirhm’s V~ , Rohiimscnmm, p. 69,
nSLikc tIme rceemnt grcnmn c’mmminargo tim (lie Smnvicts. tire gnmimn export
cigreeimrc’imt is mm/mt c’ommsistecit svithi mm c’mmnlninc’reimmi woi’hd gn’ainm
mnmarket, Smmc’hm mm nmmirkm’t ccnmtinnes tcm bnmnic’timnn clc’spitm’ timc’ nil—
ilmc’rocms trmmchimng migrc’c’mmmc’mmts lnm’t’,vc’emr gos t’rcmmiic-’nts (mit mmften
igummnre mmmmmrkct price. ~
0
mdcc’lcihe ci worich mmnmmrkct exists, govi-’rnm—
nmcmmt ,icmtimmns scmc’Ir mis bilateral trmiclc’ mmgrc,c’mrmc’mmts-’,nmrl grmnnm
emmmhnargmms c’mnm dci little tin increase mr imnunecle world tunic mnr tim
rechmuec’ price ctrimulnih ity emocsc’dl ins c’i’mmp failures or ahcn’. c’
ccc i’rmmgi’ crimps in immchvidomml nmmmtimmnms, Graimm eontimmmmi’s to mmmtmsc’
Irimnmm mtrc’as wimere graimu prices mo-i’ relatis i’hy low tin mcrcmms wimcre




For c’s- tinpie , if tire Sos i C ts pmmmcii ase mnrore gm aiim
fronr tIre 1 nriteel Stat s ‘time1 less elsewhre’re’ (i
tluerc’ us mmo dir’uur~.,c mr total Scrs itt imrrpouts ) at mmm’trkc
pri ‘e 5, otime r gm aimu expcrrtiurg mm’ttkmmm 5 55 iii, i mm titrim,
e s-pomt Ic. st otine Scrs iets ‘mdl nmore to the other miii-
portimrg natmomms suclm as lapin and We stem mm Europe.
flue ss orld price wou m lel still albc’ tte’ world gm aiim
pmodtmctiomm (supphy) to ss omhei ccmmmsmmmmre’ns (ehe mmmamrel)
as timonglm the tic ‘its dlidl mmot exist ‘tni~1totmtl 1, . S.
e\~d)rts s ou Id u emmrain un ‘hinged. hi tIme ‘ugm e’cmmme mit,
fom exammrpie mequtire dl time Soc iets to pmurehmase nmore
gr uimm fm ommm time firm ite’dl States i mm mm m oumc mmmarke’t i mrg
se am ti manm time’s ss’amrtc d te) pull chmase tint’s coil hel re’—
ci tce’e’ tire ii imu reimasc’s I rcmmmm otime m mmatiomms cmr se hi
oure of timeir dlommm e sticills pmodutcd’dl grii mm omm time
ss’dmrldl mn irke t to offset time mmmiss ‘timted p tmrcir (ses.
U enmce the mmmi mr i mmmiinn ponelm ‘use reajuti m c’mmmc’mmts of
tire’ agm c e’mmme’ irt I ikess ise lm’tx c’ h itti e’ umc’t immmpac’t 0mm
ss Orldl gr timm trade on 5 om Id gm aium price.
Dc s1mite time grc ‘tter t’chmilits imm gmammm utimzatiomm
imm time Sos iet Utmiomm in mccc nt seams. timere us mmcm cci-
(hence that time s ol mm mmmc’ of crrtin i mtih/ uti omm, Iis estock
mm tm mnilmem 5 01 mneat bmrodluctmon hras e aece he m ‘utedl si nmee
thmc’ ‘tirrec’mmre mit. Total Sos iet rm 11mm umse rinse’ 1.9 pe m—
cc mmt Imem ‘~cur dumimmg tire fomim ‘scams pm ior tc) time’
igree m mmc’mit tmmd 0.6 pe cccnt ire m x e’ n fromm m I .,)77 to
1980 after ti mc’ agree mmmc nit ( t,ui mhe 5).
timns tcm~ cc c’c ( ml tcmmm Ii i umttnc’hi lime hi mcmi (a mmmi Emmu
Ii mngcn ‘ tins Rm’c cmii \nmgm, tS‘pt mob ‘n lYSt) p~n ... S
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Time rates of increase in Soviet cattle and sImeep
nrunmmbers hrave eleciinmeel, tire &rrnrner fronmm 2.1 to 1.4
pe’rce’mmt per year annel time latter frommn 1.3 to 0.9 per—
cenmt imer year. Wimihe time rate of increase inn inogs ac—
celeratecI, alnmrost all time gaimm was tire result emf a
catc’hr—ruimprocess to recplenmisim inog umtunmmbers timat were
redmucccel simarpiv followimmg the s’erv sirarp dechnne inn
tire 1975/76 graimm croim. Hog mmummmhers dropped 20
pecrcccnmt frommn jammuary’ 1975 to Jammuary 1976, aumel mm
jammuary’ 1977 were still about 12 pereemmtless timamn imr
1975. 1 Icrg mmsmnmmbers rcrse ommby about 0.3 percemmtper
vecar eluirimmg time eurtire period 1972—80. Of time fercmcl
aumimmrais, omnly-’ poultry has accelerated simmee time
agreenmecurt frcmnm a3.2 percent anmumrmal rate inn tire foumr
years prior to time treaty to a 7.9 pereenmt rate eburinng
tire imost—treaty years.
Overall, Soviet nmeat premdutcticmnm, svirile nmrainm—
taimninng greater y’ear—to—ve’ar stalmility simmc’e time agree—
mmmenmt, iras sirowun less growtim. 1)ttrimmg time foumr pre—
treaty’ years meat otutput remse at a 3.2 percenmt rate;
imm time post—treaty years it has risemm at a 1.5 percent
rate. Connsequueuntly’, time trenrd toward risiumg depemmd—
emmce 0mm immmports of grainm iry tine Soviets oceuurred
iargel~’prior to time grcn’nm agreennemnt. Tlmere is umo
evidlemmcec that tine treaty iras increased tire tremmel or
he’d to additiommal overall inmmports.
SUMMARY
“fire Soviect grainm agreenmecmmt may-’ iras’e mad sommne
desirable’ side effects. If imnforummationm Omi crop conneli—
tiouns is obtainmed tirrougim time treaty, it serv’es’’asatool
to hneip price time graium stocks oum Imammel, annd Inasteum
time eMmaunsicmmm cmr conmtractiomm of prodtcctiemn in tine
rest oftime world imm responmse tem time latest Scms’ietcrop
cemurditionns. Tirere is little ex’ieleumde, however, tinat
time agreenmmennt hnas commtributecl to risimmg U.S. grainm
exports, greater stalmibitv of U.S. graimm exports, or
greater graimn ~rice stability.
Soviet graimm imtmrehase’s fromim U.S. scmsmre’es has’e
ime’conmme sommnewimat nnmore stalmie, imut tireir purcimase’s
frommm ctimer graium—ecxportimug nationms inave apparemmtb~’
heconmme mmmore variable, offsettiung time price—stabiliz—
immg effects of timecir less erratic U.S. ptmrclnases. U.S.
graium pricecs imas’e stabilized sonnness-’inat simmce 1976.
However, rehatis-e to time pride beiravior of all crops,
imotim feed graium aumd whmeat prices inave heemm less
stable sinnee tire agreecmmnemmt.
Timese results are coursistent witim a world grainm
nnnarkect where graimms nnmove relaiicely fi’eelq Ire—
tweenr areas. 1mm smehm a world mmmarket, agreenmneunts
damn do little to affect time overall grain trade of a
mmatioum. Jumereaseel sales to omme u’catiomr are offset imy-’
reelumc,ecl sales to other mmationrs. Time werrid lmride
ailocates premdumetiomm to conmsumnmers’annd a elecisiour
b’s’ oume unatioum to mmmake all cmf its sales tem or imturcinases
fronmm aurotiner mmatiemmm wihh mmot lnas-e a sigurificaunt imnm—
pact cmmn total world grainr trade or drum time world1 grainm
pride.
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